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ABSTRACT 
This thesis examines the emerging relationship of two Middle Eastern regional 
powers—Saudi Arabia and Iran—with a globally expansionist Chinese state. Due to the 
existing U.S. national security interests in the Middle Eastern region, it is critical to 
identify the principal drivers that have prompted both Iran and Saudi Arabia to develop 
closer ties with China in order to determine if and how these relationships may affect 
U.S. interests. Clarifying the dynamics of the Sino-Saudi and Sino-Persian relationships 
will enable U.S. decision makers to better anticipate the effects those relationships may 
have on the Middle Eastern region. To determine the drivers compelling Saudi Arabia 
and Iran closer to China, the thesis applies a qualitative case study method to examine 
aspects of the economic, diplomatic, and security factors of the Sino-Saudi and 
Sino-Persian relationships. The research broadly assesses the period that established 
formal relations—1979 for the Sino-Persian case and 1990 for the Sino-Saudi 
case—through present day. The research found that economic factors are the main drivers 
contributing to closer ties in both the Sino-Saudi and Sino-Persian relationships. 
Although this thesis clarifies the factors that compel the Sino-Saudi and Sino-Persian 
relationships, these factors are not indicative of what drives other Middle Eastern 
countries to develop stronger ties with China. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
This thesis examines the emerging relationship of two Middle Eastern regional 
powers—Saudi Arabia and Iran—with a globally expansionist Chinese state. Critical to 
the research question is identifying the factors that have contributed to Saudi Arabia and 
Iran increasing ties with China. In recent years, China has been paying more attention to 
the Middle East primarily because of China’s rising energy demands.1 Since Saudi 
Arabia and Iran established formal diplomatic ties with China, their relationships with 
China have transformed its role in the region from being a negligible actor to now the 
primary destination for Saudi and Iranian oil.2 China, for the most part, is reluctant to 
expand its role in the region for fear of being embroiled in regional tensions.3 As Sino-
Saudi and Sino-Persian ties increase, it is important to determine how Saudi Arabia and 
Iran benefit from their relationships with China. To answer this question, it is critical to 
identify the principal drivers that have prompted both Iran and Saudi Arabia to develop 
closer ties with China. 
B. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION 
This research is significant for three reasons. First, it provides insight into what 
factors drive Saudi Arabia and Iran to develop closer ties with China. The National 
Security Strategy (NSS) states that the United States seeks a Middle East that is “not 
dominated by any power hostile to the United States, and that contributes to a stable 
global energy market.”4 For this reason, it is essential to determine what factors drive 
Saudi Arabia and Iran to develop stronger ties with China and what benefits they gain 
                                                 
1 Robert G. Sutter, Chinese Foreign Relations: Power and Policy Since the Cold War, 3rd ed., Asia in 
World Politics (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2012), 290–94. 
2 Andrew Scobell and Alireza Nader, China in the Middle East: The Wary Dragon (Santa Monica, 
CA: RAND Corporation, 2016), 7–8. 
3 Scobell and Nader, China in the Middle East, 2. 
4 White House, National Security Strategy of the United States (Washington, DC: White House, 2017), 
48, https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf. 
2 
from their relationships with China. Clarifying the dynamics of the Sino-Saudi and Sino-
Persian relationships enables decisionmakers to better anticipate the effects those 
relationships may have on the Middle Eastern region. 
Second, the research provides insight into how Saudi Arabia and Iran may 
leverage China to pursue their strategic interests and the impact it will have in the Middle 
Eastern region. It is of particular concern to the United States how Saudi Arabia and Iran 
will leverage their growing ties with China since the United States continues to have 
strategic interests and concerns in the region. For example, per the National Security 
Strategy, the region remains a security concern due to the presence of terrorist 
organizations like ISIS and al-Qa’ida. Another security concern for the United States is 
Iran’s growing influence throughout the Middle Eastern region and whether it could 
destabilize partner nations.5 In short, since the United States continues to have strategic 
concerns in the Middle East, it is important to understand whether Saudi Arabia and Iran 
will use their relationships with China as leverage and for what purpose.  
Lastly, it is critical to understand whether the growing Sino-Saudi and Sino-
Persian relationships will undermine U.S. policies and objectives in the region. The 
emergence of a great power competition means that the United States must reassess its 
strategy in the Middle East. Implementing an expansive U.S. policy in the Middle East is 
no longer possible because near-peer competitors, such as China, have emerged, forcing 
the United States to adopt a more tailored approach toward the region.6 To date, China 
has not played a significant role in the region; however, this is changing as China 
increases economic, diplomatic, and security ties with Saudi Arabia and Iran—the two 
leading actors in the region.7 It is important to assess what consequences to U.S. interests 
in the region will arise due to the U.S. pivot from the Middle East toward the Indo-
Pacific. 
                                                 
5 White House, National Security Strategy, 49. 
6 White House, 2–3. 
7 Scobell and Nader, China in the Middle East, ix–x. 
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C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Sino-Saudi and Sino-Persian economic, diplomatic, and military relations have 
strengthened over the past few years.8 The factors behind this growth are multilayered, 
complicated, and driven by convenience. International relations theories such as hedging, 
in regard to the Sino-Saudi case, and soft balancing, in regard to the Sino-Persian case, 
help explain certain aspects of the two relationships but do not fully explain it. Analyzing 
economic, diplomatic, and military cooperation provides a more satisfactory answer and 
reveals important insights into the factors driving Saudi Arabia and Iran to pursue closer 
ties with China.  
1. International Relations Framework 
Soft balance is a non-military form of balancing. Robert A. Pape explains, “soft-
balancing measures do not directly challenge a unipolar leader’s military preponderance, 
but they can delay, complicate, or increase the costs of using that extraordinary power.” 9 
States exert soft balancing in various ways, including using economic systems, 
international institutions, and diplomatic relations to delay or prevent a hegemon from 
obtaining their objectives.10 Pape further explains, “although soft balancing relies on 
nonmilitary tools, it aims to have a real, if indirect, effect on the military prospects of a 
superior states.”11 Soft balancing is an instrument available to weaker states that are not 
able to hard balance against a hegemon. Based on the literature, soft balancing can evolve 
into hard balancing but is a more attractive option since it is easier and bares fewer 
consequences.12 
Hedging is an alternative to balancing. Kui Cheng-Chwee defines hedging as “a 
behavior in which a country seeks to offset risks by pursuing multiple policy options that 
                                                 
8 Scobell and Nader, China in the Middle East, 1–20. 
9 Robert A. Pape, “Soft Balancing Against the United States,” International Security 30, no. 1 
(Summer 2005): 17. 
10 Pape, “Soft Balancing Against the United States,” 10. 
11 Pape, 36. 
12 Pape, 10, 15–18. 
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are intended to produce a mutually counteracting effects, under the situation of high-
uncertainties and high-stakes.”13 He contends that hedging is a good alternative to 
balancing in circumstances where there is no immediate threat to a small and militarily 
weak state.14 Due to the uncertainty of regional order, “the smaller states can no longer 
afford to develop too close or too distant a relationship with any of the major power.”15 
On the one hand, being too close to a major power can lead to the loss of independence of 
the weaker state. Another negative consequence is that it could drag the weaker state into 
conflict if it is forced to support the more powerful state. On the other hand, being too far 
from the major power may lead the weaker state to lose some benefits.  
2. Sino-Saudi Relations 
Volatility in the Middle Eastern region and the fall of the Soviet Union prompted 
Saudi Arabia to formally establish diplomatic relations with China in 1990.16 The Iranian 
Revolution, the Iran-Iraq War, and Saddam’s invasion of Kuwait made Saudi Arabia 
realize that it needed to expand its defensive capabilities.17 Consequently, Riyadh began 
purchasing military equipment from China, including ballistic missiles, which other 
countries were unwilling to supply.18 Andrew Scobell and Alireza Nader explain that 
“following this geostrategic breakthrough, China has emphasized economic ties, although 
it has not neglected diplomatic and military elements, to advance interests in Saudi 
Arabia.”19 After the fall of the Soviet Union, Saudi Arabia was more open to moving 
closer to China.20 Scobell and Nader assert that “rapprochement was made easier by the 
belief that China, while a communist regime, was not militarily or ideologically 
                                                 
13 Kuik Cheng-Chwee, “The Essence of Hedging: Malaysia and Singapore’s Response to a Rising 
China,” Contemporary Southeast Asia 30, no. 2 (August 2008): 163, https://doi.org/10.1355/CS30-2A. 
14 Cheng-Chwee, “The Essence of Hedging,” 164. 
15 Cheng-Chwee, 164–65. 
16 Scobell and Nader, China in the Middle East, 24–25. 
17 Muhamad S. Olimat, China and the Middle East Since World War II: A Bilateral Approach 
(Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2014), 216–18. 
18 Scobell and Nader, China in the Middle East, 25. 
19 Scobell and Nader, 24. 
20 Olimat, China and the Middle East Since World War II, 215–16. 
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threatening (unlike the Soviet Union) and at the same time offered the possibility of 
economic and even security cooperation.”21  
After China’s economy recovered in the 1990s, its energy demands dramatically 
increased.22 For China, Saudi Arabia has become of great strategic importance as trade 
between the two countries has increased.23 Jonathan Fulton asserts that “the Sino-Saudi 
relationship is China’s most important in the Middle East and has become one of Saudi 
Arabia’s most important relationship beyond the Middle East as well.”24 Fulton explains 
that China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) will further deepen the relationship between 
China and Saudi Arabia.25 
Energy trade is at the heart of Sino-Saudi economic relations.26 Clayton Cheney 
explains that by 2017 “Saudi Arabia [met] approximately 20 percent of China’s oil 
import demand, which has caused bilateral trade between the two countries to rise from 
$1 billion in 1990 to $70 billion in 2013, making Saudi Arabia a significant contributor to 
the Chinese economic engine.”27 The trend of increasing trade between the two countries 
over the past three decades will likely continue as Saudi Arabia has roughly 18 percent of 
the world’s total oil reserves and China’s energy needs are expected to increase from 6 
million barrels per day (mb/d) in 2015 to 13 mb/d in 2035.28 How much trade increases 
between the two countries depends on how well Saudi Arabia overcomes competitors 
                                                 
21 Scobell and Nader, China in the Middle East, 25–26. 
22 Scobell and Nader, 20. 
23 Mohammed Turki Al-Sudairi, “Sino-Saudi Relations: An Economic History” (Gulf Research 
Center, August 2012), 3–4, https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/156677/
Final_Completed_Sino_Saudi_Economic_History_Report_3778.pdf. 
24 Jonathan Fulton, China’s Relations with the Gulf Monarchies, (New York, NY: Routledge/Taylor 
& Francis Group, 2019), 72. 
25 Fulton, China’s Relations with the Gulf Monarchies, 106. 
26 Iain MacGillivray, “Maturing Sino-Saudi Strategic Relations and Changing Dynamics in the Gulf,” 
Global Change, Peace & Security 31, no. 1 (January 2, 2019): 64–65, https://doi.org/10.1080/
14781158.2018.1475350. 
27 Clayton Cheney, “Sino-Saudi Energy Relations,” Global Affairs Review, November 9, 2017, 
https://gareviewnyu.wordpress.com/2017/11/09/sino-saudi-energy-relations/. 
28 Chris Zambelis, “China and Saudi Arabia Solidify Strategic Partnership Amid Looming Risks,” 
China Brief 17, no. 3 (March 2, 2017), https://jamestown.org/program/china-saudi-arabia-solidify-strategic-
partnership-amid-looming-risks/; Cheney, “Sino-Saudi Energy Relations.” 
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trying to gain a more significant piece of the Chinese market. Saudi Arabia faces 
considerable competition from other leading exporters of oil, like Iran and Russia.29 Not 
securing the largest oil importing market is a concern for Saudi Arabia since “the oil 
sector accounts for 90 percent of Saudi exports, 80 percent of its government revenues 
and 40 percent of its GDP.”30 Additionally, according to Clayton Cheney, Saudi Arabia 
is looking to diversify its trade and planning to increase the percentage of its GDP 
coming from the non-oil sector from 16 to 50 percent, which likely includes expanding 
trade and investment with China.31  
Whereas Sino-Saudi diplomatic and economic relations have expanded, security 
relations have been limited primarily to Chinese arms sales.32 The first steps in their 
security cooperation date back to 1985, when Saudi Arabia purchased 36 CSS-2 
intermediate range ballistic missiles and nine launchers from China.33 It is important to 
note that the Sino-Saudi security relationship is not exclusive, as Saudi Arabia continues 
to rely on the United States for arms sales. Conversely, China continues to trade with 
other countries in the region, including Saudi Arabia’s regional competitor the Islamic 
Republic of Iran. Scobell and Nader assert that “to date, the bilateral defense relationship 
appears heavily skewed toward secretive arms sales of sensitive weaponry, with far more 
limited activity in other realms, such as military-to-military exchanges and exercises.”34 
Overall, when compared to purchasing from the United States and the United Kingdom, 
Saudi weapons purchases from China have been negligible since 1990. For example, in 
the period between 2005–2009 China accounted for only 6 percent of the total volume of 
Saudi arms imports. However, Jeffrey Lewis posits that weapons sales between Saudi 
                                                 
29 Cheney, “Sino-Saudi Energy Relations.” 
30 Cheney. 
31 Cheney. 
32 Scobell and Nader, China in the Middle East, 39–44. 
33 Joseph A. Kechichian, “Saudi Arabia and China: The Security Dimension,” Middle East Institute, 
February 9, 2016, https://www.mei.edu/publications/saudi-arabia-and-china-security-dimension. 
34 Scobell and Nader, China in the Middle East, 40. 
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Arabia and China are likely higher than official numbers suggest due to secret weapons 
transfers.35 
3. Sino-Persian Relations 
Although the Islamic Republic of Iran originally began to pivot toward China 
after the Iranian Revolution in 1979, it has become heavily reliant on China in recent 
years as it attempts to respond to enduring external sanctions and internal 
mismanagement. United States started to isolate the Islamic Republic soon after the 
revolution, and, in the 1990s, it began to ramp up the pressure.36 In 2006, the United 
Nations Security Council (UNSC) unanimously approved sanctions against Iran, after 
recognizing that Iran was pursuing efforts to develop a nuclear weapon.37 With a 
growing number of enemies and not many allies, the Islamic Republic realized early that 
it would have to accept a certain level of dependence and reliance on other nations to 
secure the survival of the regime. Esfandiary and Tabatabai assert that “politically, 
Tehran had to turn toward a great power for support after it lost Washington following 
the fall of the Shah.”38 Iran turned toward China after the revolution and has continued to 
seek its support. To date, the Sino-Persian political relationship has alternated between 
periods of strong and weak levels of cooperation. For example, in 1997, China 
significantly downgraded relations with Iran over the concern that this relationship would 
create tension in the U.S.-Sino relationship.39 By the beginning of the 2000s, China 
became less concerned about its relationship with the United States, leading it to resume 
high-level cooperation with Iran and build the foundation for deeper Sino-Persian 
                                                 
35 Scobell and Nader, 41–43. 
36 Dina Esfandiary and Ariane Tabatabai, Triple-Axis: China, Russia, Iran and Power Politics 
(London: I.B. Tauris, 2018), 96–97. 
37 Zachary Laub, “International Sanctions on Iran,” Center on Foreign Relations, July 15, 2015, 
https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/international-sanctions-iran. 
38 Esfandiary and Tabatabai, Triple-Axis, 71. 
39 Scott Harold and Alireza Nader, China and Iran: Economic, Political, and Military Relations 
(Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2012), 4, http://public.eblib.com/choice/
publicfullrecord.aspx?p=1365153. 
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relations in the 21st century.40 Cordial diplomatic relations between Iran and China have 
spearheaded cooperation into other realms, including trade.41  
In 2009, China became Iran’s largest trading partner, and, in 2011, it became the 
largest importer of Iranian oil.42 Iran has expanded economic ties with China as China’s 
energy demands have increased. For example, China has invested in other sectors of the 
economy, including infrastructure like airports and dams. Furthermore, China has 
continued conducting business with Iran despite the UNSC’s first round of sanctions in 
2006. For example, the period between the final round of UNSC sanctions in 2010 and 
the signing of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in 2015, exports from 
Iran to China grew by 24 percent, and imports from China to Iran grew by 25 percent.43 
The Islamic Republic is mindful that China is not the most reliable partner considering 
that international pressure has stopped China from selling Iran certain military 
equipment, including nuclear technology.44 Currently, Iran is limited in terms of finding 
countries that are willing to conduct business with it.  
Iran aims to be self-sufficient in the realm of defense and security; however, it 
recognized quickly after the revolution that it would have to depend on other countries to 
obtain the necessary equipment and technology to modernize its military.45 For Iran, this 
realization occurred when Saddam Hussein invaded Iran in 1980.46 During this period, 
Iran found a sympathetic partner in China that was willing to supply it with weapons it 
otherwise would not have been able to obtain.47 Today, China is Iran’s largest arms 
                                                 
40 Harold and Nader, 6. 
41 Esfandiary and Tabatabai, Triple-Axis, 76. 
42 Sara Bazoobandi, “Sanctions and Isolation, The Driving Force of Sino-Iranian Relations,” East Asia 
32, no. 3 (September 2015): 264, https://doi.org/10.1007/s12140-015-9244-4; Scobell and Nader, China in 
the Middle East, 59. 
43 Esfandiary and Tabatabai, Triple-Axis, 101. 
44 Esfandiary and Tabatabai, 75. 
45 Esfandiary and Tabatabai, 122. 
46 Afshon Ostovar, Vanguard of the Imam: Religion, Politics, and Iran’s Revolutionary Guards (New 
York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2016), 62–64. 
47 Ostovar, 82. 
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supplier, a critical actor fueling Iranian military modernization efforts, and has also 
supported its nuclear endeavors. Scott Harold and Alireza Nader assert that “from the 
Chinese perspective, there is strategic value in helping Iran develop enough military 
capabilities to counter U.S. dominance of the Persian Gulf.”48 Iran has benefitted from 
China’s strategic ambitions and will likely continue to leverage China in its favor. 
Esfandiary and Tabatabai explain that “Tehran’s priorities in defence spending and 
acquisition lay in three critical areas: Modernizing its air force and air defence, beefing 
up its cyber capabilities and developing its counterterrorism apparatus.”49 In the short 
term, Iran will continue to depend on China for the requisite military equipment and 
technology to modernize its defense capability. 
D. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESES 
The following hypotheses are presented to explain why relationships in the Sino-
Saudi and Sino-Persian cases have increased in recent years: 1) Saudi Arabia considers 
China as an alternative to the United States but looks to benefit from relationships with 
both countries; 2) Iran must increase ties with China since sanctions have deterred other 
countries from conducting business with the Islamic Republic; 3) both Saudi Arabia and 
Iran will leverage the benefits associated with their relationships with China to counter 
each other’s efforts to increase influence in the Middle East. 
(1) Saudi Arabia considers China as an alternative to the United States but 
looks to benefit from relationships with both countries. 
As China’s role in the region develops, Saudi Arabia will try to benefit from it. 
Scobell and Nader assert that “for Saudi Arabia, China may present a partial solution to 
its uneasy partnership with the United States.”50 As the Sino-Saudi relationship evolves, 
Saudi Arabia will likely pursue a policy of hedging with China to offset risk of over-
depending on the United States. Saudi Arabia will be cautious, however, not to develop a 
similar over-dependence on China.  
                                                 
48 Harold and Nader, China and Iran: Economic, Political, and Military Relations, 18. 
49 Esfandiary and Tabatabai, Triple-Axis, 128. 
50 Scobell and Nader, China in the Middle East, 28. 
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(2) Iran must increase ties with China since sanctions have deterred other 
countries from conducting business with the Islamic Republic.  
As China’s footprint in the Middle East expands, Iran will likely continue to 
increase relations with China. According to Tabatabaj and Esfandiary, for Iran, “China 
effectively shelter [s] [it] from complete isolation and provide [s] it with political support, 
defence assistance, and economic ties that it cannot receive elsewhere.”51 Iran will likely 
continue to expand its political, economic, and security ties with China as a result of 
being isolated from the international community. Furthermore, a closer relationship with 
China will help Iran soft-balance against the United States—the country that is 
responsible for the sanctions—and a key rival actively working to curtail Iran’s growing 
influence in the Middle East.  
(3) Both Saudi Arabia and Iran will leverage the benefits associated with their 
relationships with China to counter each other’s efforts to increase 
influence in the Middle East. 
A complicated dimension in the Sino-Middle Eastern relations is striking a 
balance between Saudi Arabia and Iran. A report by the Harvard Kennedy Belfer Center 
indicates that “the Persian Gulf region’s major powers, the Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI) 
and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA), have, at least since the 2003 U.S.-led invasion 
of Iraq, been engaged in a hegemonic rivalry over power and influence.”52As both 
countries nurture closer ties with China, they will likely attempt to leverage those 
relationships to hard-balance against the one another. 
E. RESEARCH DESIGN 
The thesis applies a qualitative case study method to examine aspects of the 
economic, diplomatic, and security factors of the Sino-Saudi and Sino-Persian 
relationships. Initially, this study intended to focus on the relationships between China 
and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and between China and Iran, but, due to time 
                                                 
51 Esfandiary and Tabatabai, Triple-Axis, 2. 
52 Ali Fathollah-Nejad, “The Iranian–Saudi Hegemonic Rivalry,” Belfer Center, October 25, 2017, 
https://www.belfercenter.org/index.php/publication/iranian-saudi-hegemonic-rivalry. 
11 
limitations, the research treats Saudi Arabia as a representative case for the GCC. A more 
robust study would include all GCC nations, but that would be the subject of a lengthier 
project. The research broadly assesses the period that established formal relations—1979 
for the Sino-Persian case and 1990 for the Sino-Saudi case—through present day. The 
research analyzes in greater depth, however, the recent events that have encouraged Saudi 
Arabia and Iran to develop closer ties with China.  
F. THESIS OVERVIEW  
Chapters II and III present the Sino-Saudi and Sino-Persian case studies, 
respectively. The case studies provide historical analysis as well as a review of economic, 
diplomatic, and security cooperation. Chapter II presents the Sino-Saudi case study and 
highlights the importance of energy trade and its decision to diversify its portfolio of 
partnerships as key driving factors in the Sino-Saudi relationship. Chapter III provides 
the Sino-Persian case study, which reveals that conditions that have emerged due to U.S. 
and International sanctions and the mismanagement of the economy by the Islamic 
Republic are some of the key drivers leading Iran to pursue a stronger partnership with 
China. Chapter IV considers these insights in more depth to discern that the United States 
will have to contend with a growing Chinese presence in the Middle East but may be able 
to benefit from more involvement by China in the region.  
12 
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II. SINO-SAUDI RELATIONS 
Saudi Arabia’s pivot to Asia is not surprising; King Abdullah (2005-2015) and 
King Salman bin Abdulaziz (2015-present) have been pushing foreign policies in that 
direction for close to two decades.53 In particular, Saudi Arabia’s relationship with China 
has become one of its most important outside of the Middle East and its most important 
in Asia.54 China’s growing need for oil is the primary driver behind the relationship. 
Today, China is Saudi Arabia’s top export destination.55  
Analyzing the factors that drive Saudi Arabia to pursue stronger ties with China 
and examining Sino-Saudi economic, diplomatic, and military cooperation reveal 
important insights. Saudi Arabia is proving to the region and beyond—including 
specifically to the United States—that it can diversify its portfolio of partnerships to help 
it increase regional power and reach strategic objectives, even if that means increasing 
ties with China.56 In short, Saudi Arabia is engaging, in some respect, in hedging 
behavior since it perceiving a potential overdependence on the United States.57 Also 
advantageous is the fact that building a closer relationship with China helps Saudi Arabia 
balance against its regional rival, the Islamic Republic of Iran.58 
A. OVERDEPENDENCE ON OIL AND ON THE UNITED STATES DRIVES 
SAUDI ARABIA CLOSER TO CHINA 
There are a number of challenges the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is currently 
facing. First, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia depends on the income generated from the 
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sale of oil, and, as such, it is affected by changes in the oil market. For example, Figure 1 
illustrates that when oil prices fell from $130 per barrel in 2014 to $30 per barrel in early 
2016, it led to a significant decrease in Saudi GDP.59 About 90 percent of the 
government’s revenue comes from the sale of oil.60 Consequently, Saudi Arabia benefits 
from a stable oil market and from having reliable consumers for its oil.  
 
Figure 1. GDP of Saudi Arabia from 2010 to 201861 
To avoid the impact caused by changes in the oil market, the Kingdom of Saudi 
Arabia needs to move away from its dependence on oil and it plans to do so by 
diversifying its sources of income. Transform its economy requires a significant 
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monetary investment in sectors like manufacturing, finance, petrochemicals, and 
construction.62 According to the consulting firm McKinsey and Company, Saudi Arabia 
needs about $4 trillion in investment to double its GDP, which is the level of economic 
growth it was able to accomplish during the previous decade.63 At this time, the Saudi 
government is not in a position to develop these sectors on its own since it has been 
implementing austerity measures to reduce its spending, including reducing the stipends 
it provides to its population.64 If Saudi Arabia is unable to enact the necessary reforms to 
decrease its dependence on oil, it could deplete its foreign exchange reserves in the near 
future. Due, in part, to low oil prices, Saudi Arabia has been running a budget deficit and 
has been consistently withdrawing from its overseas assets. In 2016, the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) warned that if Saudi Arabia continued withdrawing from its 
overseas assets at its then-current pace, it could deplete those funds within five years.65 
According to CEIC, a firm that provides data on developed and developing economies, as 
of July 2019, Saudi Arabia’s foreign exchange reserves were at $492.3 billion, which is 
significantly lower than the all-time high of $731.2 billion in August 2014, as depicted in 
Figure 2.66 In short, Saudi Arabia has been forced to cut spending due to changes in the 
oil market at the same time that it is attempting to transform its economy. To achieve this 
goal, Saudi Arabia will require outside investors. 
                                                 
62 Al-Kibsi et al., “Saudi Arabia Beyond Oil: The Investment and Productivity Transformation,” 7–10. 
63 Al-Kibsi et al., 1. 
64 Chen, “The Economic Adjustment of Saudi Arabia and the Docking of Bilateral Economy and 
Trade between China and Saudi Arabia under the ‘One Belt and One Road’ Initiative,” 53. 
65 Chen, 48–49. 




Figure 2. Saudi Arabi Foreign Exchange Reserve July 2014 to July 201967  
Whether the government can alleviate some of the state’s economic difficulties by 
securing outside investments remains to be seen. These problems are widespread and 
include high unemployment, with some estimates placing the rate as high as 30–35 
percent.68 Unemployment in particular is a serious concern since 4.5 million new 
workers are expected to enter the Saudi labor market in the next few years.69 Adding to 
these concerns is the Kingdom’s increasing domestic consumption of the same oil it 
depends on for revenue. According to a report by Glada Lahn and Paul Stevens from the 
Chatham House in London, if Saudi Arabia maintains the same pace of oil consumption 
it could become a net importer of oil by 2038.70  
Lastly, the Saudi government acknowledges that it needs to move away from its 
dependence on the United States; Saudi priorities in some arenas diverge from the 
hegemon and it benefits from connections with other countries that are willing to help it 
achieve those priorities. In short, over the past few years Saudi Arabia appears to have 
been reevaluating its relationship with the United States, perceiving a potential 
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overdependence.71 Friction emerged over disagreements regarding the U.S. response to 
the Arab Spring, its limited engagement in the Syrian civil war, and Obama’s decision to 
negotiate with Iran on its nuclear program.72 The friction between the United States and 
Saudi Arabia was not unique to the Obama administration, however, since anti-Saudi 
backlash emerged immediately following the September 11th attacks.73 This continuous 
friction has compelled Saudi Arabia to be more cautious regarding its dependence on the 
United States. U.S.-Saudi tensions have relaxed since President Trump took office in 
2017 as he has continuously reaffirmed the importance of the relationship.74 
Nevertheless, Saudi Arabia is actively looking for countries that will help it achieve its 
strategic objectives while reducing its overdependence on the United States. 
B. SINO-SAUDI RELATIONS  
China’s increasing thirst for oil, its policy of noninterference in the Middle East, 
and its willingness to overlook human rights violations makes it an increasingly attractive 
partner for Saudi Arabia.75 Today, China is the largest importer of oil, and, by 2034, it is 
projected to surpass the United States in overall oil consumption.76 China’s growing 
need for oil has been at the core of Sino-Saudi relations, but this relationship has 
expanded into the areas of investment and defense.77 In regard to defense, what makes 
China attractive to Saudi Arabia is China’s minimal restrictions on what type of weapons 
                                                 
71 Chaziza, “Strategic Hedging Partnership,”448. 
72 Azad, “Saudi Arabia Looks East,” 142. 
73 Flynt Leverett and Jeffrey Bader, “Managing China‐U.S. Energy Competition in the Middle East,” 
The Washington Quarterly 29, no. 1 (December 2005): 195, https://doi.org/10.1162/016366005774859643. 
74 Donald J. Trump, “Statement from President Donald J. Trump on Standing with Saudi Arabia,” 
whitehouse.gov, November 20, 2018, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/statement-
president-donald-j-trump-standing-saudi-arabia/. 
75 Scobell and Nader, China in the Middle East, 30, 34. 
76 Xuming Qian and Jonathan Fulton, “China-Gulf Economic Relationship under the ‘Belt and Road’ 
Initiative,” Asian Journal of Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies 11, no. 3 (September 2017): 13, 
https://doi.org/10.1080/25765949.2017.12023306. 
77 Hussain, Saudi Arabia in a Multipolar World, 150. 
18 
systems it is willing to sell the Kingdom. For China, Saudi Arabia is a partner that can 
help China expand its geopolitical and economic influence.78 
Saudi Arabia, and the Arab world more broadly, play an important part in China’s 
Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).79 This initiative, however, does not dictate a specific 
policy toward Saudi Arabia.80 Although China does not have a specific policy guiding 
Sino-Saudi relations, it did release a strategy for the Middle Eastern region. In a 
document entitled “China’s Arab Policy Paper,” China explained its approach toward the 
greater Middle East.81 In this document, China describes a comprehensive cooperation 
strategy known as “1+2+3,” according to Xuming Qian. In China’s blueprint for 
developing Sino-Arab relations, “1” refers to energy cooperation, which is at the core of 
the strategy.82 The “2” are the wings supporting energy cooperation, and they include 
infrastructure development and trade/investment facilitation. The “3” refers to necessary 
breakthroughs in high tech and include cooperation in the areas of nuclear energy, new 
and clean energy, and aerospace.83 Chinese foreign policy in the region has been focused 
on multi-spectrum relations and has not focused on cultivating relations with any single 
country. For example, China maintains cordial relations with Iran, a key Saudi rival in the 
region.84 China likely prefers Saudi Arabia over its regional rival, however, since Saudi 
Arabia is a more reliable supplier of oil and does not carry as much political baggage. In 
short, China’s interests in the region are evolving, and Saudi Arabia is one of several 
allies in the region with which it is building closer ties. Fortunately for the Kingdom, 
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countries like China have a growing demand for Saudi oil, and it is unlikely to diminish 
in the near future. 
In turn, for Saudi Arabia, China represents an alternative option to its dependence 
on the United States.85 Saudi Arabia is using its relationship with China to strategically 
hedge against the United States.86 Mordechai Chaziza defines strategic hedging as “a 
foreign policy employed by second-tier states in competing and cooperating with the 
system leader to cope with the uncertainties typical of unipolar systems.”87 This strategy 
of hedging is not unique to Saudi Arabia in the Middle East, as Jean-Loup Samaan 
explains that “Gulf countries have progressively been diversifying their strategic option, 
by ‘hedging’ against the risk of a U.S. retreat and building ties with Asian powers.”88 
One of the Asian countries Saudi Arabia has turned to is China. Middle Eastern countries, 
including Saudi Arabia, are diversifying their portfolio when it comes to partnerships that 
can help them increase regional power.89 For Saudi Arabia, increasing ties with China 
also sends a message to the United States that there are other countries available to help it 
achieve its objectives in the region.90 Additionally, building closer ties with China will 
also help Saudi Arabia balance against its regional rival—the Islamic Republic of Iran.91 
A clear example of this was when Saudi Arabia tried influencing China to implement 
stricter sanctions against Iran in 2010.92 According to Iain MacGillivray, “as Saudi 
Arabia starts to exert more pressure on China to contain Tehran, Beijing will find it 
difficult to sustain its policy of non-interference and middle of the road diplomacy.”93 In 
short, Saudi Arabia has been increasingly using its relationship with China not just to 
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benefit itself economically, but as a strategic way to communicate its discontent to the 
United States and to contain regional rivals to increase its position in the Middle East.94 
1. Economic Cooperation 
Working closely with China can help Saudi Arabia move away from its 
dependence on oil and generate the necessary income to develop other sectors of the 
economy. Trade between China and Saudi Arabia has grown from $296 million in 1990, 
when diplomatic ties were established, to $73 billion in 2012.95 Currently, crude oil and 
the petrochemical industry remain at the heart of the growing trade relationship that links 
Saudi Arabia and China, but that may change in the future if Prince Salman meets his 
objectives of diversifying the Saudi economy.96  
a. Oil 
Saudi Arabia is one of the top suppliers of oil for China and has competed with 
Russia to become China’s top oil supplier for years, as Figure 3 shows.97 China is 
currently the world’s top crude oil importer, and estimates from the U.S. Department of 
Commerce predict that China will continue to rely on oil imports to meet its energy 
needs. One report cited by the U.S. Department of Commerce predicts that China will 
import 80 percent of its crude oil supply by 2030.98 As of 2019, China’s growing need to 
import oil resulted from increased refinery capacity, declining domestic oil production, 
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and moves to increase strategic oil reserves.99 Figure 4 shows that by July 2019, Saudi 
Arabia was exporting 1,802,788 million barrels per day (bpd) to China, a significant 
increase from August 2018 when it was exporting 921,811 bpd, while Saudi oil exports to 
the United States steadily declined.100 If these trends continue, Saudi Arabia will likely 
have the opportunity to continue increasing oil exports to China, which would benefit 
Saudi Arabia significantly.  
 
Figure 3. China’s Crude Oil Imports by Origin from 2012 to 2017101 
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Figure 4. Saudi Arabia Oil Exports to China and the United States102 
China’s increasing demand for oil benefits Saudi Arabia since its government 
heavily relies on the money generated from the sale of oil for funding, but China benefits 
as well.. A key benefit for China derived from importing Saudi oil is that Saudi Arabia is 
able to provide a reliable supply.103 In the Middle East, China has placed greater 
emphasis on its relationship with Saudi Arabia over Iran because the former is less 
problematic and, as such, is perceived to be a more reliable and secure source of oil in the 
long term.104 This policy was evident in late 2019 when China decreased oil imports 
from Iran and increased Saudi oil imports after the United States renewed sanctions on 
the Islamic Republic.105 It is important for countries that depend heavily on exporting oil 
to determine how the market is shifting, since they face stiff competition from other 
regional players like Iraq. Saudi Arabia has determined that the future of the crude oil 
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market is in Asia since the demand in Western markets has peaked and countries like 
China and India are not going to turn to alternative sources of fuel until after 2035. As 
such, China will likely remain an attractive destination for Saudi oil exports.106  
b. Petrochemicals 
The petrochemical sector is one of eight sectors Saudi Arabia is hopeful will 
generate the requisite growth and jobs to double its GDP by 2030.107 As such, the 
petrochemical sector offers increased trade and collaboration for Saudi and Chinese 
firms, and Chinese markets have been important for Saudi petrochemicals.108 Saudi 
Arabia is one of the world’s largest producers and exporters of petrochemicals, which 
constitute Saudi Arabia’s largest non-oil export sector, while China is one of the largest 
consumers. In 2016, this industry comprised 60 percent of the Kingdom’s non-oil exports 
at a value of around $28 billion.109 That same year, despite efforts to be self-sufficient, 
China imported 14.5 million metric tons of petrochemicals from GCC nations.110 If this 
trend continues it will likely lead to increased opportunities for the Saudi petrochemical 
sector. To achieve this objective, though, the sector will require foreign direct 
investment.111 As of 2017, according to Norafidah Islmail, there were at least four joint 
petrochemical ventures between Saudi and Chinese firms in Quanzhou, Yanbu Industrial 
City, Tianjin, and Dalian.112  
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c. Direct Investment 
Increasing direct investment from Chinese firms will contribute to developing 
non-oil sectors of the Saudi economy and move it away from a dependence on oil. There 
are several areas in which Chinese firms have begun investing. For example, in a study 
conducted by in 2009, John Sfakianaki found that 158 Chinese companies were working 
in Saudi Arabia in sectors including construction, telecommunication, petrochemical, and 
infrastructure, amongst many others.113 In turn, Saudi Arabia has also invested in China. 
For example, SABIC invested millions in research and development in Chinese firms.114 
Finding more countries willing to invest and increasing the investment amounts from 
countries like China will be increasingly more important moving forward for Saudi 
Arabia. According to a study by the McKinsey Global Institute, if Saudi Arabia is to 
reach its objective of doubling its GDP by 2030, it will require $4 trillion in investment 
from Saudi and international private investors, and China will likely be a top priority for 
the Kingdom as a source of future investments.115 
2. Diplomatic Relations 
Saudi and Chinese officials have been working to bolster the diplomatic relations 
originally established in 1990. The meetings between Chinese and Saudi heads of state 
have focused on energy but have also addressed the topics of national sovereignty and 
security. The first state visit between China and Saudi Arabia took place in 1999, when 
Chinese President Jian Zemin visited King Fahd in Riyadh. The focus of this Sino-Saudi 
state visit, according to Jonathan Fulton, was energy cooperation. Similarly, in January 
2006, during a visit from King Abdullah to China, the main areas of discussion were 
economic and trade issues, including cooperation in the areas of oil, natural gas, and 
minerals. Later that year, President Hu Jintao visited King Abdullah in Saudi Arabia and, 
again, energy cooperation remained a key focus of the visit.116 During this visit, the two 
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countries signed a security agreement, and President Jintao expressed his support for 
Saudi efforts to “safeguard national sovereignty and territorial integrity.”117 This focus 
by President Jintao on sovereignty and territorial integrity came during a period when 
President George W. Bush was strongly promoting democracy in the Middle Eastern 
region. In 2009, President Jintao visited Saudi Arabia and this meeting generated 
proposals to maintain high level-visits and expand economic and trade cooperation.118 In 
May 2019, during a telephone conversation with King Salman, President Xi indicated 
that China “firmly supports Saudi Arabia’s efforts to safeguard national sovereignty, 
security and stability, and supports Saudi Arabia to promote economic transformation and 
achieve greater development.”119 King Salman and President Xi agreed to similar 
commitments during a 2017 meeting in China, in which security cooperation—along with 
energy, finance, and investment—was an area highlighted for closer cooperation.120  
This evolution of the Sino-Saudi relationship betrays a concentration on the 
domain of low politics but also a possible expansion into the area of high politics.121 
High politics includes the issues that matter most to a state, like national sovereignty and 
security. All other matters, including the economy and trade, fall in the category of low 
politics.122 In short, since the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two 
countries, their interactions have been heavily focused on energy cooperation and trade, 
while security ties have developed far more slowly, and include some sensitive topics.123  
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Currently there are no major disagreements between Saudi Arabia and China, but 
there are issues they disagree on, like the Syrian Civil War and how to deal with Iran. In 
regard to Syria, Saudi Arabia opposes the Assad regime since the regime is a close ally to 
Iran. China has sided with Russia, has supported Assad, and has vetoed UN resolutions 
regarding the civil war. As a result, Saudi Arabia has voiced its displeasure with China 
over this issue. Iran is also a point of contention for the Sino-Saudi relationship.124 Iran is 
Saudi Arabia’s regional rival, while China views the Islamic Republic as a problematic 
partner that can nevertheless help China meet its energy needs.125 Iran is an important 
source of oil for China. Recently, however, Chinese imports of Iranian oil dropped due to 
the U.S. reinstating sanctions against the Islamic Republic. It appears that China may be 
limiting its economic engagement with Iran, at least at the moment, and Saudi Arabia has 
been benefitting from this situation.126 In short, to date, there are points of tension in the 
Sino-Saudi relationship but nothing significant that could curtail the relationship’s 
growth.  
3. Military and Security Cooperation  
Sino-Saudi military cooperation, including arms sales, have remained limited in 
scope.127 Cooperation in the realm of defense and security predate the establishment of 
diplomatic ties between the two countries and can be traced to 1988, when Saudi Arabia 
purchased CSS-2 intermediate-range ballistic missiles from China.128 Military sales 
between the two countries, according to available data, are negligible when compared to 
U.S.-Saudi weapon transactions.129 Although Saudi Arabia does not view China as a 
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replacement for its leading supplier of weapons, the Kingdom does, in part, see China as 
an alternative option for whenever the U.S. refuses to sell specific types of systems.130  
In the area of military-military exchanges and exercises the Sino-Saudi 
relationship is also limited, even more so than in the sector of arms sales. Andrew Scobell 
and Alireza Nader found from a 2012 defense white paper from China that its armed 
forces have not participated in a military exercise with Saudi armed forces, whether 
bilateral or multilateral.131 In 2016, Saudi Arabia held its first anti-terrorism drills with 
China. The drill took place in China and involved twenty-five people from each 
country.132 
A concern for Saudi Arabi is that its military lacks the manpower to effectively 
mobilize to defend territorial sovereignty against regional aggressors. As a result, the 
Kingdom is largely dependent on the United States for its regional security.133 The rise 
of Iranian influence in the Middle East region, its growing proxy network, its meddling in 
the internal affairs of Saudi regional partners, and the willingness of the United States to 
remove sanctions in 2015 add to Saudi Arabia’s security concerns.134 If Saudi Arabia 
seeks to reduce its dependence on the United States in the security realm, it would benefit 
from strengthening security ties with China. 
C. CONCLUSION 
Over the last three decades, Saudi Arabia’s relationship with China has evolved 
into one of its most important relationships. Saudi Arabia benefits from securing a 
dependable energy partner that will import its oil and can help meet strategic objectives, 
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as outlined in the Saudi 2030 Vision.135 In turn, China benefits from having access to 
Saudi oil to meet its growing thirst for the commodity. With China projected to remain 
one of the leading importers of oil for the foreseeable future, and Saudi Arabia likely to 
continue to over rely on the export of oil for revenue, the likely result is that the two 
countries will continue to move closer together.136 Furthermore, Saudi Arabia welcomes 
China’s policy of noninterference where human rights violations or issues regarding 
oppression create less of a roadblock to doing business.137  
Additional benefits for Saudi Arabia having a close relationship with China, 
besides economic incentives, include being able to turn to China when there is 
uncertainty in its relationship with the United States. This was the case when Obama 
pursued a nuclear deal with Saudi Arabia’s regional rival, Iran, which led to 
dissatisfaction amongst key leaders in the Kingdom. Saudi Arabia understands that 
overreliance on the United States will leave it vulnerable when there are policy 
disagreements between the two states.138 As such, Saudi Arabia has engaged in hedging 
behavior by diversifying its portfolio of partnerships and that includes its partnership with 
China. Furthermore, Saudi Arabia also benefits from being the preferred partner of choice 
in the region, over Iran.139 In 2019, China increased oil imports from Saudi Arabia after 
it lowered imports from Iran, due to renewed U.S. sanctions on the Islamic Republic.140 
China has been hesitant to play favorites in the Middle Eastern region, but it is clear that 
China prefers dealing with less problematic partners.141  
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The Sino-Saudi relationship has largely remained in the realm of low-politics.142 
Security ties between the two countries do not appear to be on the same level of 
importance as trade, since they have been slower to develop.143 For example, Sino-Saudi 
military sales are negligible when compared to U.S.-Saudi military sales.144 Whether the 
Sino-Saudi relationship evolves into the realm of high politics in the future remains to be 
seen. What is clear is that China will remain an attractive partner for Saudi Arabia in the 
foreseeable future. 
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III. SINO-PERSIAN RELATIONS
Over the last 40 years, Iran’s relationship with China has evolved from one 
focused on arms sales to one centered on oil and energy trade.145 This relationship has 
steadily increased in importance for Iran as it has faced mounting opposition by the 
international community over its behavior, including its decision to pursue a nuclear 
weapons program.146 Following years of economic sanctions and continued efforts by 
the United States to destabilize the Iranian regime, the Islamic Republic has retained very 
few international allies.147 Recently, Iran has deepened economic, diplomatic, and 
military ties with China, which is one of the few countries still willing to work with the 
rogue regime.148  
Analyzing the factors that drive the Islamic Republic to pursue stronger ties with 
China and examining Sino-Persian economic, diplomatic, and military cooperation reveal 
important insights. Sanctions, economic challenges, and domestic unrest have led to Iran 
seeking partnerships that can help provide relief to these conditions and in China it has 
found such a partner. Also advantageous is the fact that building closer ties with China, a 
country that has advance technology and military capabilities, and is willing to sell it to 
Iran can help the Islamic Republic to strategically balance against U.S. influence in the 
Middle East.149  
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A. U.S. AND INTERNATIONAL SANCTIONS HAVE LED IRAN CLOSER 
TO CHINA 
For years, the United States and the international community have levied 
sanctions against Iran, contributing to the regime’s isolation and lack of allies or trade 
partners.150 A major challenge for the Islamic Regime is how to overcome the 
continuous pressure it faces from the United States. For example, in 2018, President 
Trump started a campaign to apply “maximum pressure” on the Islamic Republic, 
reinstating U.S. sanctions and further deteriorating socio-economic conditions in Iran.151 
Today, as during the period following the Iranian Revolution and the imposition of 
international sanctions in 2010, countries doing business with Iran are beginning to shy 
away.152 The most recent sanctions have barred Iran from participating in the global 
financial system, which has led to companies in Qatar, United Arab Emirates, and Turkey 
that conduct business with Iran to stop their business ventures.153 After sanctions were 
reinstated in 2018, both oil exports, as evidenced in Figure 5, and foreign direct 
investments have declined in Iran.154 In short, continued tension with the United States 
has further isolated the Islamic Republic from the international community by leaving it 
with few countries willing to conduct business with it, leading it to seek countries still 
willing to work with it to reduce the impact of U.S. pressure.155 Iran is aware it is not 
able to compete against the United States so its best option is to find countries willing to 
work with it to soft-balance against the United States and China is such a partner. 
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Figure 5. Iran’s Oil Output from 2011 to 2019156 
Keeping the regime in power is a major concern for Iran since it is geographically 
and politically surrounded by countries that are hostile toward it, like Saudi Arabia and 
its Gulf Cooperation Council allies, Israel, and the United States, and it lacks the military 
power to defend itself.157 To counter these threats Iran must be militarily capable to 
defend itself or rely on other countries willing to protect it. Due to sanctions, Iran is 
limited in the type of weaponry it can purchase. Iran’s conventional forces have suffered 
from their inability to obtain necessary weapons systems and equipment. Due to the 
hostile environment that surrounds it and its conventional military limitations, Iran has 
pursued a policy of supporting nonstate militias throughout the region to expand its 
influence and has been largely successful in this endeavor.158 Despite these successes, 
Iran still looks for countries willing to work with it to counter its regional rivals, sell it 
weapons, and provide other supplies it needs.  
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Overcoming the negative impact that sanctions have had on the Iranian economy 
as a result of driving would-be investors away and reducing the number of countries 
willing to buy Iranian oil is another major challenge. The new series of sanctions 
imposed by the United States have had a crippling effect on the Iranian economy.159 
Those effects are expected to continue to cripple the Islamic Republic into the next few 
years. At the end of 2019, the IMF expected the Iranian economy to be 90 percent of 
what it was two years earlier.160 For 2020, some international organizations are 
expecting zero growth in the Iranian economy.161 Furthermore, the IMF expects inflation 
to hit 29 percent during 2020, while the World Bank estimates it will be closer to 31 
percent.162 Iran enjoyed a period of economic growth that included an increase in oil 
exports during the period in which the U.S. was part of JCPOA, but that growth is now 
long gone, as Figure 6 portrays.163  
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Figure 6. Iranian Economic Growth from 2005 to 2019164 
The economic challenges from sanctions threaten the regime since the domestic 
population has protested country-wide to demand relief from the hardships the people are 
facing. Iran has an unhealthy economy, capital flight, widespread corruption, severe 
droughts, water shortages, high unemployment rates and inflation.165 The Iranian people 
are tired of the government’s inability to address these issues and frustrated with what 
some feel has been the mismanagement of the economy by the government.166 This 
combination of socio-economic grievances has been at the center of protests that have 
occurred in Iran in recent years and this threatens the stability of the regime. Recent 
protests have been larger in size, bolder, and directly aimed against the regime. For 
example, protestors burned a statue of the founder of the Islamic Republic, Ayatollah 
Khomeini, and have attacked police and military sites throughout the country.167 
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Furthermore, as part of the protests, many demonstrators have openly called for the end 
of the Islamic Republic. In response, the Iranian government conducted brutal 
crackdowns during which security forces used lethal force against protestors.168 Most 
recently, in late 2019, Iran experienced the deadliest political unrest in years; it started 
when widespread protests aimed at the government turned violent and resulted in the 
death of at least 180 people.169 The government has thus demonstrated that it maintains 
the capacity to suppress protests, but whether it can effectively address the socio-
economic grievances that led to the riots remains to be seen.170 As such, Iran is actively 
looking for countries willing to invest domestically and buy its oil as a means of 
overcoming the crippling effects of U.S. sanctions.  
B. SINO-PERSIAN RELATIONS 
China has demonstrated a willingness in the past to stand by Iran during difficult 
moments, and it has the financial capability to help the regime alleviate some of the 
difficulties created by sanctions.171 Additionally, for Iran, China is a country they can 
partner with to soft balance against the United States the leading proponent of sanctions 
against the Islamic regime. China has cautiously maneuvered closer to Iran over the past 
few decades, after the United States and Europe left a diplomatic and economic void 
following the establishment of the Islamic Republic and the implementation of 
sanctions.172 In particular, China increased its presence in Iran in the early 2000s during 
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the same period Western companies began withdrawing from the Islamic Republic after 
its secret uranium program was revealed.173  
In seeking relief for the damage caused by sanctions and international isolation, 
Iran has grown closer with China since it is willing to trade, sell weapons, and, on 
occasion, help defy international pressure. Iran continues to deal with challenges it is 
unable to resolve on its own and will need assistance from other countries if it expects to 
improve its current situation. In particular, Iran is likely looking for a partner that is not 
closely aligned to the United States or, at the very least, is willing to confront the 
hegemon.174 Today, China, mainly due to its growing economic, military, and diplomatic 
power, is the most attractive option available from the countries that are still willing to 
conduct business with the rogue regime.175 For Iran, China has developed into a key 
strategic partner. An area of concern for Iran is that the relationship that has emerged is 
unbalanced; Iran has developed a dependence on China as a trade partner, including 
weapons purchases.176 On the other hand, China has the ability to turn to other Middle 
Eastern countries, like Saudi Arabia, to meet its energy needs.  
1. Economic Cooperation 
Iran’s economic relationship with China falls into two broad categories: energy 
trade and infrastructure. Oil sales tend to dominate the former, while direct investment 
facilitate the latter. 
a. Oil 
At the core of Sino-Persian trade is China’s growing need for oil.177 In 2000, five 
percent of Iran’s total oil exports were sold to China, and by 2017 this number had 
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increased to 28 percent.178 Figure 7 illustrates that in 2017, China was the main 
destination for Iranian oil. In turn, for China, during that same period, exports of Iranian 
oil accounted for only nine percent of its total oil imports. Since sanctions were reinstated 
in 2018, there have been several shifts in oil imports between Iran and China.179 To 
curtail the damage caused by sanctions in the past, Iran has turned to countries willing to 
work with it—particularly non-Western countries like Russia and China.180 The state of 
the Iranian economy makes it evident that Iran has to actively pursue countries, like 
China, that can provide some relief to its economic situation by continuing to trade with it 
or, if possible, by increasing the trade amount.  
 
Figure 7. Iran’s Top Oil Export Destinations for 2017181 
In China, Iran has a partner that is willing to work with it despite the regime 
continuing to face pressure by the United States.182 Iran has benefitted from its 
relationship with China, not least because China has emerged as Iran’s biggest economic 
partner, which led the Islamic Regime to generate profits it would otherwise not have 
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had.183 China is an obvious trading partner for Iran since other countries are not willing 
to trade with it and China has a growing demand for Iran’s main export item—oil. Iran 
remains one of the largest energy reserve regions, and energy trade is the backbone of 
Sino-Persian economic ties.184 In 2014, bilateral trade between the two countries reached 
$51.8 billion, as Figure 8 depicts.185 In 2017, China was the top destination for Iranian 
exports, importing 31 percent of the Islamic Republic’s total exports for a total value of 
$16.9 billion, 64 percent of which was crude oil.186  
  
Figure 8. Bilateral Trade between China and Iran from 1992 to 2014187 
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China’s need to diversify its energy imports, due to its growing energy needs and 
its decision to reduce its reliance on coal, makes the relationship with Iran a good fit.188 
During the 1990s, China’s economy grew due to its rapid industrialization, and with that 
its energy needs increased.189 Furthermore, the Iranian market provided opportunities for 
any country willing to invest in it, and particularly those that had money to invest. 
Although Iran’s hydrocarbon resources remain some of the largest in the world, the 
extraction rates have remained relatively low compared to other countries. Inadequate 
and aging technology, along with a lack of foreign investment, have contributed to the 
Islamic Republic not being able to take better advantage of one of its main resource, 
hydrocarbons; so, countries willing to invest can potentially make a good profit.190 So 
far, China has continued to be willing to remain a key trading partner to the Islamic 
Republic.191  
Recently, Iranian oil exports to China have significantly fluctuated due to 
sanctions.192 In May 2018, China was importing 29 percent of total sales of Iranian oil, 
which equated to 775,000 bpd.193 During that same month, the Trump Administration 
abandoned the nuclear deal, and, by November 2018, the United States had formally 
reinstated sanctions.194 Figure 9 illustrates the drop in Iran’s total oil exports to China 
from the May 2018 quantity to 333,300 bpd in September of that same year. China had 
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initially received a waiver from the United States allowing it to buy Iranian oil without 
penalty.195 By June 2019, China was continuing to import Iranian oil following the 
expiration of the U.S. waivers, which had occurred during the previous month, but by this 
period the total volume had significantly decreased.196 Iran has continued to export oil 
and has found willing buyers in Asia and the Mediterranean but at a much lower volume 
than in previous years.197 
 
Figure 9. Chinese Crude Oil Imports from Iran from January 2014 to May 
2019198 
Overall, U.S. sanctions have had a substantial impact on Iranian oil exports. For 
example, Iran was exporting 2.5 million bpd in April 2018, and one year later that 
                                                 
195 Aizhu et al., “China Continued Iran Oil Imports in July in Teeth of U.S. Sanctions: Analysts.” 
196 Yacoubian, “Iran’s Increasing Reliance on China”; Aizhu et al., “China Continued Iran Oil 
Imports in July in Teeth of U.S. Sanctions: Analysts.” 
197 Singhvi, Wong, and Lu, “Defying U.S. Sanctions, China and Others Take Oil From 12 Iranian 
Tankers.” 
198 Source: Aizhu et al., “China Continued Iran Oil Imports in July in Teeth of U.S. Sanctions: 
Analysts.” 
42 
number had reduced to 1 million bpd, even while the U.S. waivers were still valid.199 By 
June 2019, after the U.S. waivers had expired, Iran was exporting approximately 500,000 
bpd.200 As of August 2019, some senior Trump Administration officials have estimated 
that between 50 and 70 percent of total exported Iranian oil is heading to China.201 If 
these most recent numbers are true, China may increase in importance for the Islamic 
Republic in the immediate future. 
b. Investments 
Iran’s economic relationship with China goes beyond energy trade. Iran has 
allowed China to invest in many parts of the country’s infrastructure, including subway 
stations, airports, dams, shipbuilding, and electricity. Missile attacks and artillery shelling 
from Iraq left Iran’s infrastructure in a dire state after the end of the Iran-Iraq war, and the 
Islamic Republic lacked the capital to rebuild on its own. As a result, Iran sought foreign 
investors, especially China, for assistance. For example, in 2001, China’s International 
Trust and Investment Corporation (CITIC) helped Iranian companies complete the first 
line of the capital’s metro. The bid for this project had started in 1991, and the initial 
agreement occurred five years later.202 Iran would likely have had a difficult time 
completing this project on its own, since it lacked the necessary technology, including the 
braking system, which it obtained from China.203 China has also invested in Iran’s 
energy infrastructure—$30 billion in 2009 alone.204 Chinese companies have also 
invested in developing several gas and oil fields in recent years, including South Pars 
Phase 11, South Azadegan, and Isfahan Oil Refinery.205 Iran will benefit from additional 
Chinese investments in sectors like manufacturing, transport, construction, and energy. 
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2. Diplomatic Relations 
Iran has benefited diplomatically from having a close relationship with China, 
since it is able to take advantage of China’s diplomatic power and the leverage that state 
has in institutions like the United Nations. Most notably, China has provided Iran with 
international support that has likely shielded it from more severe sanctions after its secret 
uranium enrichment program was revealed.206 Initially, China refused to cooperate with 
the United States and prevented the Iran nuclear issue from being referred to the 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).207 In doing so, China prevented the issue 
from being referred to the United Nations Security Council for sanctions, thereby 
delaying international sanctions.208 In 2010, China actively worked to curtail U.S. efforts 
that would have implemented more severe sanctions against Iran, then was also 
responsible for postponing the vote for this new set of sanctions. China later agreed with 
a more watered-down version of the initially proposed sanctions, in part because of 
international pressure—mainly from the United States.209 
This capitulation is representative of the uncertainties in the relationship between 
Iran and China. The Sino-Persian relationship is described by China as a “comprehensive 
strategic partnership” where both sides cooperate on areas of interest but do not get 
entangled in the other countries’ conflicts.210 A key premise that predates this new label, 
and is still very much alive, is the concept that this partnership will not jeopardize 
relationships with other countries.211 When China’s relationship with Iran started to 
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interfere with its relationship with the United States, China chose its relationship with the 
United States over its relationship with Iran.212 In short, Iran has a close but complicated 
diplomatic relationship with China that is influenced by other countries but, for the most 
part, continues to benefit from it.  
Sino-Persian diplomacy has involved frequent visits from high-ranking diplomatic 
officials from both countries, including their heads of state; the visits have fostered and 
improved relations.213 In May 1989, Iranian President Ali Hosseini Khamenei visited 
China to seek increased cooperation between the two countries.214 In 1992, President 
Hashemi Rafsanjani’s visit to China resulted in the signing of several joint projects. 
During this visit, China agreed to provide Iran with its first nuclear power plant.215 More 
recently, China has continued to demonstrate support toward the Islamic regime by 
continuing high-level visits even after increased U.S.-Iranian tensions. For example, in 
early 2002, Chinese President Jian Zemin visited China only a few months after U.S. 
President George W. Bush included the regime in the “Axis of Evil.”216 Sino-Persian 
diplomatic relations continued to be close throughout the 2000s even while the United 
States worked hard to increase sanctions against Iran.217 In June 2012, Iranian President 
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad visited China at the behest of Chinese President Hu Jintao 
following another tense period between the United States and Iran.218  
After Trump reinstated sanctions against Iran in 2018, China has continued to 
work with Iran. In September 2019, Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif 
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visited China looking to consolidate what he referred to as a “strategic partnership,” 
which he described in an op-ed he wrote and published during the same period.219 This 
visit followed an earlier visit he made in February 2019 when he met with President Xi, 
who reiterated China’s commitment to Iran regardless of changes in the international 
arena.220 Iran will continue to benefit from strong diplomatic relations with China 
moving forward.  
There are several issues on which Iran and China disagree, which can potentially 
limit the growth in their relationship. Most notably, Iran and China differ in their interests 
in regard to the United States. Iran views the United States as a rival, while China is 
highly dependent on the United States for economic growth and is willing to subordinate 
its relationship with Iran when necessary.221 Furthermore, Iran continues to be a difficult 
partner and has garnered negative political attention, which can potentially affect 
China.222 China seeks stable partners and a stable environment in which to conduct 
business, and Iran’s behavior toward the U.S. threatens those objectives. Some Chinese 
are hesitant to conduct business in Iran because they consider the environment volatile, 
corrupt, and risky.223 After Major General Qassim Suleimani was killed by an American 
drone strike in early 2020 and tension increased between Iran and the United States, 
Chinese businesses will likely be cautious to increase their footprint in the Islamic 
Republic.224 Also, as discussed in Chapter II, China has a close relationship with Saudi 
Arabia, which is Iran’s regional rival. China imports more oil from Saudi Arabia than 
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Iran, has deeper trade ties with the Saudis, and will likely not place that relationship at 
risk to support Iran.225 In short, there are many challenges that can potentially limit 
growth in the relationship between Iran and China moving forward. 
3. Military and Security Cooperation  
Over the past four decades, Iran has benefited from its defense cooperation with 
China, receiving weapons systems and military technology while also increasing Iran’s 
military capability.226 After an arms embargo was placed on Iran following the 
establishment of the Islamic Republic, China was still willing to sell it weapons, 
including Silkworm missiles, after a war broke out with Iraq.227 During this period, 
China also provided Iran with anti-tank and anti-air weapons, mortar rounds, and artillery 
pieces.228 As China’s weapons and equipment have become more sophisticated, Iran has 
looked to benefit from such capabilities and has purportedly involved itself in the 
production process of some of the weapons it has purchased from China in an attempt to 
build its own domestic capacity.229 Iran’s controversial ballistic missile program, where 
China assisted the Islamic Republic in developing its own domestic capacity, is an 
example of this relationship. In 2008, China surpassed Russia to become Iran’s largest 
weapons supplier.230  
Beyond these tangible measures, Iran has been able to gain proficiency through 
joint military exercises with China. In 2014, Iran and China held its first combined 
maritime exercise; this joint exercise focused on anti-piracy drills and led to the first 
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Iranian port call by a Chinese naval ship.231 More recently, in December 2019, Iran held 
another joint maritime exercise with China focused on countering piracy and 
terrorism.232 In short, Iran has been able to modernize certain aspects of its military 
despite an embargo due to its close relationship with China.  
C. CONCLUSION 
Iran has developed an unbalanced relationship with China. Today, after years of 
dealing with sanctions that have destroyed its economy and opportunities for upward 
mobility for its population, Iran has become dependent on China.233 China is one of the 
few countries still willing to conduct business with Iran, sell it weapons, and conduct 
military exercises with it.234 Furthermore, China likely provides Iran with its best 
opportunity to resist U.S. pressure aimed at making the regime reform its behavior, since 
China is one of the most capable and technologically advanced countries in the world. In 
short, China can help Iran soft balance against U.S. dominance in the Middle East region 
and limits its power. An example of this is when China actively worked toward watering-
down the severity of international sanctions eventually implemented against Iran.235 
Furthermore, China has provided Iran with much needed military equipment, including 
equipment that helped it fight Saddam during the Iran-Iraq War and, most recently, to 
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maintain a balance against its regional competitors, the Gulf Cooperation Council.236 
However, China does not have a similar dependence on the Islamic Republic.237 For 
example, China can easily deepen its relationship with Saudi Arabia and increase oil 
imports if it considers its relationship with Iran too risky.238 If these conditions continue, 
along with continued U.S. pressure, the Islamic Republic will likely pursue deeper 
economic, diplomatic, and military ties with China. 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
The three hypotheses this thesis tested explain only part of why Saudi Arabia and 
Iran have been pursuing closer ties with China and, therefore, do not represent the most 
important factors. This thesis found that a close relationship with a growing economic, 
diplomatic, and military power like China can help both Saudi Arabia and Iran overcome 
some of their domestic and regional challenges. That is, the challenges Saudi Arabia and 
Iran are currently encountering are the factors driving both countries to develop stronger 
ties with China since China is seen by the Saudi and Iranian government as a partner that 
can help alleviate some of the issues caused by those challenges. Although both countries 
benefit from having close ties with China, and these benefits differ for each, the primary 
motivating factor for both appears to be economic. Saudi Arabia’s and Iran’s economies 
depend on the export of oil, and China is the world’s largest importer of oil and continues 
to increase its need for the commodity, making China an attractive partner to these states. 
Today, China is the largest buyer of both Saudi and Iranian oil, and the relationship that 
has evolved from these economic ties has spilled over to the diplomatic and military 
realms.  
A. KEY FINDINGS 
Hypothesis 1: Saudi Arabia considers China as an alternative to the United States 
but looks to benefit from relationships with both countries.  
Findings: Saudi Arabia is not looking to replace the United States as a partner, but 
it is attempting to reduce what it perceives to be an overdependence on the United States. 
Recently, diverging interests in the Middle East region have led to tensions between the 
United States and Saudi Arabia. This tension, in part, has provided Saudi Arabia with an 
incentive to diversify its portfolio of partner nations that it will be able to turn to for 
support when its interests do not align with those of the United States. Additionally, 
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China’s policy of non-interference and willingness to overlook human rights violations 
adds to the perceived benefits of doing business with China.239  
However, this factor does not appear to be on the same level of significance as 
economic factors and is not the main reason Saudi Arabia is developing closer ties with 
China. The Sino-Saudi relationship is primarily driven by economic factors, with oil trade 
at the center. This research found that Saudi Arabia’s continued dependence on the export 
of oil to generate wealth requires it to find stable and reliable consumers for its main 
export commodity.240 Furthermore, to avoid the impact caused by changes in the oil 
market, Saudi Arabia is working to transition its economy away from a dependence on 
oil, which will require significant investments on behalf of other countries or the private 
sector. In China, Saudi Arabia has found a partner that is willing buy its oil and invest in 
sectors like construction, telecommunication, and petrochemicals, which will help the 
Saudi government develop these industries.241 Developing other sectors of the economy 
will help Saudi Arabia move away from its dependence on oil, reduce its vulnerability to 
fluctuations in the oil market, and create the jobs its people will require in the future. In 
short, there are additional benefits besides economic that make the relationship with 
China attractive to Saudi Arabia, but these appear to be peripheral. 
Hypothesis 2: Iran must increase ties with China since sanctions have deterred 
other countries from conducting business with the Islamic Republic. 
Findings: 
The research found that, for Iran, years of dealing with sanctions and the 
challenges that have emerged from its isolation from international markets have been the 
most significant factors leading it to seek closer ties with China. Currently, China is one 
of the most attractive partners available to Iran due to its growing economic, diplomatic, 
and military power. Similar to Saudi Arabia, Iran generates the majority of its income 
from selling oil and having a reliable partner that is willing to buy its oil benefits the 
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Islamic Republic. Unlike Saudi Arabia, however, Iran has difficulty finding countries 
willing to import its oil since those countries are fearful of becoming ostracized from the 
international markets or incurring their own sanctions. Iran’s difficult relationship with its 
neighbors in the Middle East, its meddling in the internal affairs of these countries, and 
ongoing tension with the United States make many countries hesitant to conduct business 
with the Islamic Republic. Sanctions have devastated the Iranian economy, and, as a 
result, it is facing protests that threaten the regime due to its inability to produce jobs and 
opportunities to help the Iranian people improve their socioeconomic situation. For Iran, 
having a partner that is willing to buy its oil and invest in its domestic infrastructure and 
business sectors is appealing given its circumstances.  
Iran also benefits from China’s partnership since it is willing to provide modern 
weapons and technology. The Islamic Republic is surrounded by neighboring nations it 
perceives to be hostile, including Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Israel, Kuwait, as well as the 
U.S. military. Iran perceives these threats as endangering the survival of the regime, and 
it is aware that its conventional military is unable to defend it. Iran benefits from China’s 
willingness to sell it weapons and share technology it needs to improve its military 
capability since China has one of the most technologically advanced militaries in the 
world.  
Hypothesis 3: Both Saudi Arabia and Iran will leverage the benefits associated 
with their relationships with China to counter each other’s efforts to increase influence in 
the Middle East. 
Findings: 
This research only found one clear example of either Saudi Arabia or Iran using 
its relationship to counter the other. In 2010, Saudi Arabia tried to leverage its 
relationship with China to encourage stricter sanctions against Iran, but it was not 
successful.242 China has a policy of noninterference in the affairs of other countries, and 
it has applied this policy to its relationship with Saudi Arabia and Iran. If China continues 
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following its policy of noninterference it will likely be difficult for either Saudi Arabia or 
Iran to leverage its relationship with China against the other state. Furthermore, although 
China is the largest supplier of weapons to Iran and these weapons may threaten Saudi 
interests in the region, it has not driven a wedge in the Sino-Saudi relationship. The deep 
economic ties China has with both Saudi Arabia and Iran makes it unlikely that it will 
become directly involved in the rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Iran. Furthermore, the 
research did not find any factors that could potentially lead China to support either Iran or 
Saudi Arabia against the other. China benefits from conducting business with both Saudi 
Arabia and Iran and has applied its policy of noninterference to both relationships.  
B. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES 
United States security professionals must take into account the growing Sino-
Saudi and Sino-Persian relationships and the implications these relationships may have 
on U.S. interests in the region. The importance of China for both the Saudi and Iranian 
economies means China will maintain a presence in the Middle East. This presence 
should not be automatically perceived as being in direct competition with U.S. interests 
in the Middle Eastern region. Per the National Security Strategy, U.S. key interests in the 
Middle East include ensuring that the region contributes to a stable global energy market 
and preventing any country hostile to the United States from dominating the region.243 
Currently, neither the Sino-Saudi nor the Sino-Persian relationship threaten the stability 
of the global energy market. In actuality, both Saudi Arabia and Iran benefit from a stable 
energy market since the economies in both countries depend on the wealth generated 
from the export of oil. China’s presence also contributes to the stability of the energy 
market since it requires a continuous flow of oil from the Middle East at a stable price. In 
the end, fluctuations in the oil market affect the United States, China, Saudi Arabia, and 
Iran.  
Although Iran is hostile to the United States, it is not powerful enough to 
dominate the Middle Eastern region, and the benefits Iran gains from its relationship with 
China do not risk the balance of power in the Middle East. This is not to say that the 
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weapons Iran procures from China do not risk U.S. service members in the Middle 
Eastern region or threaten countries in the Gulf Cooperation Council, but these weapons 
and the financial benefits of Iran’s relationship with China are not enough for Iran to 
exert significant power beyond its borders. As such, closer ties between Iran and China 
do not currently threaten U.S. interests in terms of maintaining a favorable environment 
in the Middle East. As for Saudi Arabia, it continues to be a close partner of the United 
States, and, as such, the Sino-Saudi relationship does not risk U.S. interests in the Middle 
East.  
In fact, growing Sino-Saudi and Sino-Persian relationships may be in the interest 
of the United States as it could potentially utilize China’s interest in maintaining a stable 
and secure flow of oil to help maintain stability in the Middle Eastern region. Like the 
United States, China benefits from a stable Middle East since it depends on the oil it 
imports from the region. Having a country like China that also has a close relationship 
with the United States and has a growing influence in the Middle East may help when 
trying to resolve issues in the region.  
To what extent either Saudi Arabia or Iran can leverage its relationship with 
China is not yet clear since China has a strict noninterference policy and has avoided 
becoming entangled in the affairs of other countries.244 What is clear is that China has 
been reluctant to favor its relationship with other countries over its relationship with the 
United States. This was the case when China eventually agreed to sanctions against Iran, 
although initially it had stonewalled those efforts.245 Although Sino-Saudi and Sino-
Persian relations have grown stronger over the years, these relationships are subordinate 
to the U.S.-Sino relationship. Additionally, for Saudi Arabia its relationship with the 
United States continues to be its most important relationship, in part because it depends 
on it for its security.  
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C. FUTURE RESEARCH RECOMMENDATIONS 
Additional research in the following areas will help provide further insight into 
China-Middle East relations. 
Recommendation 1: Research the relationships between other Middle Eastern 
countries and China. 
Although this thesis clarifies the factors that compel the Sino-Saudi and Sino-
Persian relationships, these factors are not indicative of what drives other Middle Eastern 
countries to develop stronger ties with China. To broaden the scope, future researchers 
should explore the factors motivating other countries in the Middle Eastern region, like 
Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, and Qatar, to pursue ties with China. It is not enough to say that 
the Middle East is growing closer to China, since this is an oversimplification of complex 
relationships between several states. As this thesis conveys, there is important divergence 
in factors driving just two countries’ relationships with China, so it is reasonable to 
assume that the factors will vary throughout the entire Middle Eastern region. By 
studying each individual country in the Middle Eastern region, it will provide U.S. 
security professionals with a better understanding of the relationships that are evolving 
between Middle Eastern countries and China. 
Recommendation 2: Focus on a single theme when researching the relationship 
between states. 
Focusing on broad themes, like economy, diplomacy, and security, provides a 
broad overview of the relationship between countries, but researching a single area 
provides an opportunity for a deeper understanding of that factor. For example, this study 
found economic benefits are at the core of the Sino-Saudi and Sino-Persian relationship 
but, due to time limitations, the research focused mostly on energy trade. In the economic 
realm there are other sectors in the economic relationship that require a more in-depth 
analysis, including in the area of investment.  
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D. CLOSING THOUGHTS 
China’s role in the Middle East is likely to increase due to its growing need for oil 
and Middle Eastern countries’ continued dependence on the export of oil to generate 
wealth. As a result, China will increasingly become a factor in U.S. decision making in 
policies regarding the Middle East. As China’s economic interests increase in the Middle 
East, it becomes more likely that China’s interests will expand into other sectors like 
diplomacy and security. China’s limited interests in the Middle East have made it easier 
for it to stay the course on its policy of noninterference in the affairs of other countries. It 
appears unlikely that that policy will change in the near future but, as this thesis has 
shown, the evolution of these relationships still has important impact on all states 
involved.  
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